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Abstract
The paper illustrates the eﬃciency features of the Italian banking sys-
tem through a review of the most important empirical studies over the
last ﬁfteen years. Particular emphasis is given to DEA (dynamic envel-
opment analysis) studies and to their capability to investigate economies
of scale and geographical diﬀerences. The role of mergers — which are, as
a matter of fact, a crucial feature of several systems, including Italy — is
stressed. The Italian experience is compared to the one of old EU member
countries.
The paper concludes that there seem to be economies of scale at the
beginning of the period, while they do not seem to characterize more
recent years.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The aim of the paper is to trace out the most important eﬃciency features of
the Italian banking system, as they were investigated in the literature in the
last ﬁfteen years.
In that period, the Italian banking system has had to face the uniﬁcation
process of European markets. Actors operating in Italy have been forced to
compare themselves to foreign ones and to compete with them. In this sense,
some eﬀorts have been done to evaluate how the sector performs with respect
to results achieved by the systems of other countries.
The ﬁrst research papers computed the level of eﬃciency reached by Italian
banks and aggregated the results to give indicators of eﬃciency for the overall
country system. An analysis of the situation at the beginning of the Nineties
w a sm a d ea n dt h ed e t e r m i n a n t so fe ﬃciency, the presence of scale ineﬃciencies
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1and regional disparities were investigated (Favero-Papi, 1995 and Resti, 1994,
1997). Later, some Italian and other European authors began to compare the
results obtained in diﬀerent countries (Lozano-Vivas, 1997). More recently,
given the phenomenon of ﬁnancial conglomeration, which has been one of the
most important features of the ﬁnancial development also in Italy, the problems
of scale and scope economies and of the eﬃciency of conglomerates have been
widely investigated (Casu and Girardone, 2002a,b,c).
Two diﬀerent techniques are used to evaluate eﬃciency of banks (and of ﬁrms
in general): parametric methods, like the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA),
and non-parametric ones, mainly Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The de-
bate on which approach suits better the problem of analyzing the eﬃciency of
the banking sector is still open and has been the subject of many applied works.
Resti (1997), for example, compares the results obtained by DEA and SFA on
Italian data.
DEA, which is the technique chosen by the authors of the works analyzed
in this paper, is based on linear programming. It is judged in many studies to
be the most eﬀective way to evaluate eﬃciency and it has been largely used in
many applied works since its development. Although subject to some criticism,
the method has no need for assumptions on the form of the production func-
tion. At the opposite, parametric models need them: indeed, this is their most
questionable feature. The detractors of DEA, however, base their diﬃdence on
the absence of a term capturing measurement errors.
The paper is structured as follows: in the ﬁrst section the presence of
economies of scale and geographical diﬀerences in the Italian banking system is
investigated through the works of Favero and Papi (1995) and Resti (1994,1997).
Other possible determinants of eﬃciency are also tested. In the second section,
some cross-border studies including Italian data are presented and analyzed. In
the last part, the eﬀect of mergers and acquisitions processes and deregulation is
shown, addressing the Italian case (Casu-Girardone, 2002a,b,c) and confronting
the results with those obtained in other country studies (Vander Vennet, 2002).
2 Determinants of eﬃciency and the presence of
economies of scale.
The number of Italian studies about eﬃciency in the banking system is not so
high. There are three important works referring to data on the period between
the end of the Eighties and the beginning of the Nineties: Resti (1994,1997)
and Favero-Papi (1995). The aim of these papers is to investigate the level of
eﬃciency reached by Italian banks, to analyze its determinants and above all
t h ep r e s e n c eo fe c o n o m i e so fs c a l e .
The period taken in exam was one of great changes in the Italian system:
home banks began to be in real competition with their foreign counterparts,
because of the higher and higher integration of European markets. The low
number of listed societies and the relatively backwardness of the national stock
2exchange market made banks the main source of funding for those ﬁrms who
were not quoted yet. For the ﬁrst time, the typical Italian commercial bank had
to compare itself to the larger universal banks, which represented the standard
model in most European Union countries. In this context, the analysis about
the presence of economies of scale became a central theme. The main question
to be addressed was whether larger banks had an eﬃciency advantage, when
compared to smaller ones.
To give an answer to this question, the t w op a p e r sq u o t e da b o v eu s e dan o n -
parametric, DEA approach. In this framework, in order to investigate whether
the eﬃciency score is aﬀected by the presence of scale eﬃciencies, the ﬁrst step
consists in running a standard DEA model under the hypothesis of constant
returns to scale (CRS). The eﬃciency scores obtained are then compared to the
ones evaluated through a modiﬁed primal problem, which accounts for variable
returns to scale (VRS):
max
t X
r=1
uryr0 + µ0
s.t.
Xm
i=1 vixi0 =1
t X
r=1
uryrj −
Xm
i=1 vixij + µ0 ≤ 0 j =1 ...n
ur > 0,v i > 0 r =1 ...t; i =1 ...m
where r is the number of outputs, yr0 is the output of the ﬁrm whose eﬃ-
ciency we want to evaluate, m is the number of outputs, ur and vi are the weights
attributed to the r-th output and to the i-th input. The sign of µ0 gives a signal
of the presence of scale economies or diseconomies. If we ﬁnd that µ0 > 0, then
there is evidence of scale economies; if µ0 < 0 we are pointing out the existence
of scale diseconomies. This has an interpretation in terms of peers, i.e. ﬁrms
which are combined to give the benchmark for each ﬁrm or, more precisely,
the eﬃcient banks which enter in the linear combination which constrains each
ﬁrm’s output in the dual DEA. If µ0 > 0, the size of the peers is greater than
the one of the ﬁrm of which we are evaluating the eﬃciency: the conclusion is
that economies of scale exist1.T h eo p p o s i t ef o rµ0 < 0.
This method, proposed by Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) is the most
used in this kind of analysis, although it is subject to some criticism. As Resti
(1994) suggests, under the assumption of equidistribution of eﬃcient ﬁrms with
respect to size, it is indeed more likely to ﬁnd economies of scale for smaller
ﬁrms and diseconomies for bigger ones, because the former set is compared to a
1Indeed, if µ0 < 0, the dual of the problem is the standard dual of a DEA model, with the
addition of a constraint imposing that
S
λi < 1.This means, in the classical interpretation
of the dual, that the weights used to construct the linear combination which represents the
ﬁrm sum to a value lower than one. It has the interpretation in terms of peers in the text: if S
λi < 1, the size of the peers is greater than the one of the ﬁrm of which we are evaluating
the eﬃciency. The fact that eﬃciency is raised by the comparison between the ﬁrm and larger
peers is interpreted as an evidence of diseconomies of scale.
3large number of bigger ﬁrms, while the latter set is compared to a low number
of even bigger ones. This is called the "sample size eﬀect". It is then wise to
use this method only with a big sample size and not to take into account the
results obtained for the ﬁrms whose size is extremely high or low. Moreover,
the method can give diﬀerent results for ﬁrms having exactly the same size, but
whose peers are diﬀerent.
Favero and Papi (1995) used a sample consisting of 174 Italian banks, rep-
resenting the 80% of total deposits, with cross-sectional data referring to 1991.
In their analysis about the determinants of eﬃciency, they tried to single out
which of the two DEA models, the constant returns to scale or the variable
returns to scale one, better ﬁtted the eﬃcient frontier of the Italian banking
system. They found a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the eﬃciency
scores given by the two formulations of the problem2 and so they concluded that
scale ineﬃciencies exist. A variable returns to scale model seems more appro-
priate to describe the envelope form than the constant returns to scale (CRS)
one; however, according to the two authors, there is no evidence of increasing
returns to scale on the envelope: for some banks the model features increasing
returns to scale, for some others it depicts decreasing returns to scale, without
a direct correlation with their size.
Resti (1994), whose sample consists of 45 banks with data referring to years
from 1988 to 1991, proposes an "index of economies of scale" (IES), equal to the
percentage increment of the eﬃciency score from the CRS to the VRS model3,
with the sign of µ0 :
IES=
µ
θVR S
θCRS
− 1
¶
|µ0|
µ0
,
where θCRS is the eﬃciency score obtained by the CRS model and θVR S by
the VRS one.
For each element of the sample, we can analyze the eﬀect on the eﬃciency
score of µ0so fd i ﬀerent signs. If we ﬁnd that the value of θ obtained with
respect to both diﬀe r e n ts e t t i n g si sa l w a y se q u a lt oo n e ,t h e nt h eb a n ki sa l w a y s
eﬃcient. If the scores obtained under the hypothesis of constant returns to scale
and under the modiﬁed problem are diﬀerent, then we have to check whether
the eﬃciency of the ﬁrm increases when compared to smaller peers.I fw eﬁnd
that µ0 > 0, as pointed out above, there is evidence of economies of scale.
Resti’s analysis4 shows the possible existence of scale eﬃciencies both for
the smallest banks - those with a deposit amount smaller than 10.000 billions
2This statement was proved by regressing the ratio between the two values on a costant.
3The DEA models contained 3 outputs (loans, deposits, non-interest income) and 2 inputs
(labour, deﬁned as the total number of employees, and capital, given by a measure of net
ﬁxed assets).
4The analysis in the paper is conducted by imposing some constraints on the weights given
to the variables in the D.E.A. model. This method is useful to give more realism to the
relative importance of each variable included in the linear program and to treat better the
joint presence of physical and monetary quantities.
4of Italian Liras - and for the biggest ones, which have a deposit amount greater
than 40.000 billions of Italian Liras. This is an interesting result, since the Italian
system is made up by a large number of small institutions. However, the ﬁrst
r e s u l tc a nb eb i a s e db yt h e" s a m p l es i z ee ﬀect". The second fact is instead
contrasting with that eﬀect, since biggest banks are obviously compared mainly
to smaller ones. The ﬁnding of an IES positive for most of the major banks is
interpreted by Resti as a clear evidence of increasing returns to scale for banks
over a certain size (30-40 thousands of billions of Italian Lire). The value of the
index is higher than zero for all the banks, ranging form 1% to 16%, with the
exception of just one element of the sample, which has a negative IES. In later
researches, Resti (Resti, 1997) ﬁnds more support to this results by confronting
mean eﬃciency scores obtained for diﬀerent groups of banks divided by size:
under the hypotheses of variable returns to scale major banks reach a general
level of eﬃciency of around 90%, while minor ones hardly pass 70%. The sample
was made up of 270 Italian banks, each one considered for 4 or 5 years (data
range from 1988 to 1992).
In the same paper (Resti,1997), the author presents an analysis on whether
geographical localization inﬂuences eﬃciency or not. The results, obtained by
dividing a large sample of banks into subgroups and computing each group’s
mean eﬃciency, show higher scores for North-Western banks, while the Southern
ones reach the lowest value. Running a CRS model, the mean eﬃciency of North-
Western banks between 1988 and 1992 is about 71%, while the Southern ones
reach 65%. The highest value in the VRS DEA model is obtained by banks
scattered among the territory (about 82%), but banks located in the North-
West outperform Southern ones (79% vs. 70%). This eﬀect holds for all the
years taken into exam.
Favero and Papi (1995) obtained the same result by regressing the scores on
a dummy which could discriminate between banks mainly located in the North,
in the Centre or in the South of Italy; they found evidence of less eﬃciency
linked to banks operating in the latter region.
Moreover, after ﬁnding evidence of variable returns to scale as mentioned
above, they tried to identify some factors inﬂuencing the eﬃciency scores. Sim-
ilarly to what they did for geographical localization, they regressed the scores
o b t a i n e dt h r o u g haV R SD E Am od e lo nt h evalues of some possible determinants
a n dt e s t e dt h es t a t i s t i c a ls i g n i ﬁcance of the OLS coeﬃcients. They regressed
eﬃciency on a dummy for size, on an indicator of productive specialization, on
t h et y p eo fo w n e r s h i p .T h e yf o u n dt h a tt h e variance explained by each of these
variables was low; however there was some evidence about the negative eﬀect
of being smaller and the positive one of specialization. This means that banks
whose proﬁts are mainly generated by non-traditional banking services and who
are big show greater eﬃciency. The results are consistent with diﬀerent choices
of inputs and outputs, relating to the Intermediation and to the asset approach5.
5According to the Intermediation Approach banks are seen as the intermediators, whose
function consists in transferring resources from units in surplus to units in deﬁcit. The Asset
Approach is a variant of the Intermediation approach; outputs are deﬁned by assets and loans,
inputs are essentialy labour, capital and deposits. In the Intermediation approach, instead,
5An interesting analysis about the inﬂuence on eﬃciency of a measure of
riskiness of loans issued by banks, although quite preliminary, was carried out
by Resti (1997). He included the ratio of "bad" loans on total loans (BTL) in
the DEA model as a non-discretionary variable6. He found evidence of a link
between credit quality and eﬃciency: ineﬃcient ﬁrms do not improve their score
when the BTL ratio is included in the model. Indeed, there is a negative and
signiﬁcant correlation (-27.5%) between ineﬃciency evaluated with a standard
VRS model and the diﬀerence between this score and the one obtained running
a model without the inclusion of the BTL ratio. From this analysis it is possible
to conclude that extra-costs in which ineﬃcient ﬁrms incur do not seem to be
generated by a more expensive but eﬀective monitoring of loans.
3 The Italian case in the European Union
>From the works of Favero-Papi (1995) and Resti (1997) we can get an idea of
the general level of eﬃciency of Italian banks. The mean level of eﬃciency in
the years between 1988 and 1991 is around 70-75% through a CRS model and
around 75-80% under a more realistic hypothesis of variable returns to scale.
Resti, who compares the scores obtained in diﬀerent years, shows that there is
no improvement in the general level of eﬃciency during the period.
The creation of an integrated European market and the progressive enlarge-
ment of the European Union increased the competition between the banking
systems of many diﬀerent countries. In this context, cross-country comparisons
became more and more important in order to ﬁnd out which of these systems
reached the higher level of eﬃciency.
Many papers have then explored this ﬁeld, starting from the beginning of
t h el i t e r a t u r eo nb a n k i n ge ﬃciency (see for example Berg et al. (1993), Pastor
et al. (1997)).
>From the period immediately before the introduction of the Euro up to
nowadays, some applied works tried to measure the general level of eﬃciency of
the diﬀerent European countries7. The need for a more complete analysis about
the general situation in the European Union became indeed greater after the
year 2000, when the integration process for the market had already walked a
long path. In this context, which is still today’s one, deregulation is increasing
integration and thus encouraging the cross-border activity of European banks.
Lozano-Vivas, Pastor and Hasan (2001) analyzed bank performances of some
of the EU member countries, in order to compute the general level of eﬃciency
of their banking systems. They obtained results based on 1993 data on 10 Eu-
ropean countries, running two diﬀerent models: a basic one and another one
deposits (current accounts and saving deposits) shift from the input side to the output one.
6Non-discretionary variables are not under the control of management: they cannot be
directly controlled by the ﬁrm in the short term. They appear in the constraints, to ensure
that each ﬁrm is compared with the ones having the same properties.
7An example of one of these works is Hollò-Nagy (2006), which carries out an econometric
X-eﬃciency analysis on the 25 countries included in the European Union until 2006.
6including environmental factors. In the ﬁrst case, they computed the mean eﬃ-
ciency score (θb) obtained by each banking system running a model containing
labor and capital as inputs and loans, deposits and other earning assets as out-
puts. The scores, which are reported in the ﬁrst column of ﬁgure 1, are low
compared to those obtained in single country studies. This is due to the fact
that a common frontier, pooling all the banks in the sample, is estimated: only
the best ﬁrms among all the countries will be eﬃcient and some ﬁrms on each
single country’s frontier will become ineﬃcient when compared to foreign ones.
It is then obvious that the mean eﬃciency scores will be lower. According to
this model, Italy ranks 5th among the countries present in the sample.
However, the analysis conducted in the paper of Lozano-Vivas et al. states
that, if we take into account the environmental diﬀerences between the EU
members, Italian banks are the least eﬃcient ones. Indeed, the second column
of ﬁgure 1 reports the scores (θc) obtained running a DEA model modiﬁed with
the inclusion of four environmental non-discretionary variables which reﬂect the
main economic conditions in which banks operate8. The results are considerably
diﬀerent from those obtained with the basic model. Countries occupying the last
positions of the ranking based on the basic model, such as Spain, Portugal and
Denmark, seem to show the highest levels of mean eﬃciency. Adding the non-
discretionary variables permits to "level the ﬁeld" and compare ﬁrms belonging
to diﬀerent countries as if they were operating in the same conditions. This
procedure always increases the eﬃciency scores, and we can expect that they will
increase more for the banks operating in worse environments. The ratio between
θb and θc can be considered as a measure of the goodness of the environmental
conditions of the country (the higher the ratio, the better the environment).
Country θb θc
Belgium 42.20 79.32
Denmark 19.91 75.45
France 24.23 40.98
Germany 26.67 57.87
Italy 25.43 33.10
Luxembourg 49.49 62.30
Netherlands 37.38 51.75
Portugal 15.99 79.87
Spain 18.91 82.14
U.K. 22.08 58.65
Table 1: eﬃciency scores for EU member countries, without and with the
inclusion of environmental variables
Italy is considered a country with one of the best economic and social back-
grounds ( its value of θb/θc is second only to Luxembourg’s one), but its eﬃ-
ciency score θc is the lowest in the sample. According to this analysis, Italy
8These variables, selected among a set of 9 variables with a forward procedure, are the
density of demand (deposits per square kilometer), a measure of the average capital (equity
over total assets), the income per branch and the salary per capita.
7seems to be an attractive market for foreign banks, who could use their greater
level of eﬃciency to exploit such an inviting environment.
According to data referred only to large banks (more than 27 millions of
assets), it seems that, also for later years, Italian banks reached a lower level of
eﬃciency with respect to the other European ones. Casu and Girardone (2002b),
ﬁnd that, constructing a common VRS frontier pooling English, French, Span-
ish, German and Italian institutions, the last ones are the least eﬃcient. More-
over, while cost eﬃciency scores for the other four countries’ system increase
during the period taken in exam (from 1993 to 1997), Italian scores do not.
4 Do conglomerates have a competitive advan-
tage?
Since the adoption of the Second Directive (1989), the European Banking system
has deeply changed. Deregulation and the increasing importance of universal
banks gave incentives to commercial banks to expand themselves or to merge in
order to consolidate their positions in the market.
Given this situation, the number of banking groups increased regularly dur-
ing the last decade. The Italian system, which was very fragmented and local-
ized at the beginning of the Nineties, reacted to the new challenge of a Single
European Market moving towards higher and higher concentration: between
1993 and 2002 there were about 500 M&A operations. The number of banks
decreased by 20% in that period, and the average number of branches, which
can be interpreted as an indicator of size for banking institutions, almost dou-
bled. This concentration process led in 2002 to a situation in which the ﬁrst
ﬁve groups held the 55% of the total assets. The push towards consolidation
has not yet come to an end: in 2006 one of the biggest mergers in the Italian
history took place, when two of the largest banking institutions, San Paolo IMI
and Banca Intesa, gave birth to a unique group.
According to Vander Vennet (2002), there is a methodological distinction
between ﬁnancial conglomerates and universal banks. The former are institu-
tions whose activity on the market is diversiﬁed and which act at least in two of
the following three ﬁelds: insurance, traditional banking and securities-related
activity; the latter have the same characteristics but do also hold equity in
non-ﬁnancial companies.
The usually mentioned advantages of a banking group, as compared to indi-
vidual institutions, are:
1. the capacity of a group to diversify risks;
2. the easiness of alliances with other businesses;
3. the better organizational ﬂexibility;
4. the possibility of exploiting scale and scope economies.
8While the ﬁrst two advantages are quite intuitively true, the last two could
be not so likely. Indeed, it is possible that the creation of a group does not
lead to a more ﬂexible organization, but to a more complex and maybe costly
structure, at least at early stages. Moreover, in the applied works there is
no clear evidence on the better performance of banking groups compared with
individual institutions.
Vander Vennet (2002), for example, analyzed the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial con-
glomerates and universal banks in Europe in the middle of the Nineties with
econometric techniques on a sample of 2375 banks (176 conglomerates and 2199
specialized banks; 1066 universal banks and 1309 non-universal ones) and data
on 1995 and 1996. He found that, while conglomerates seem to be more revenue
eﬃcient, they do not show evidence of higher cost eﬃciency9. Support to these
results is given by Casu and Girardone’s analysis (2002c) of the eﬃciency of
Italian groups in the second part of the Nineties. Their sample is composed by
all the banking groups registered in the Albo dei Gruppi Bancari: 36 in 1996,
40 in 1997, 44 in 1998, 48 in 199910.I n e ﬃciency scores range from 15% to
25%, consistently with the ones obtained for the previous years by Resti and
Favero-Papi. They seem to be mainly due to technical eﬃciency rather than to
allocative one: banking groups do not use the most eﬃcient technology, but are
more capable to choose input mixes close to the cost minimizing ones.
The years taken in exam constitute a period of increasing market concentra-
tion: the number of banking groups rises from 36 to 48. Eﬃciency, however, has
a negative trend throughout the period if evaluated from the cost side, showing
a clear decrease from 1996 to 1999. Proﬁte ﬃciency, instead, is consistently and
constantly improving11.
Year Technical eﬃciency Allocative eﬃciency Cost eﬃciency
1996 0.852 0.928 0.764
1997 0.884 0.837 0.706
1998 0.929 0.844 0.772
1999 0.742 0.758 0.578
Table 2: DEA eﬃciency scores of the Italian banking groups (1996-1999)
Casu and Girardone (2002a) applied a DEA non-parametric approach to
study the eﬃciency of Italian banking groups. The sample is made by 110
observations and it is divided into two subsamples: the ﬁrst one is composed
by 32 banking groups, the second by 43 parent companies (the institutions
leading the groups, taken individually) and 35 subsidiaries (banks which are
part of the groups and whose capital is held by the parent for at least the 20%).
The results show that banking groups reach a lower mean eﬃciency score than
stand-alone banks, namely parent companies and subsidiaries taken individually.
9Universal banks are instead more eﬃcient both on the proﬁts i d ea n do nt h ec o s ts i d e .
10The DEA model uses total loans and securities as outputs, deposits, labour and capital
as inputs.
11Scores are also regressed on some determinants. Eﬃcient groups seem to be the ones that
are more capitalized, follow a strategy of growth, have a lower incidence of labour expenses
on gross income and have better quality of loans conceded.
9Furthermore, they investigated the presence of scale economies, by evaluating
the scale eﬃciency scores. They failed to ﬁnd evidence of increasing returns to
scale for groups.
Banking Groups Individual institutions
CRS 0.834 0.883
NDRS 0.839 0.895
NIRS 0.883 0.891
VRS 0.887 0.903
Table 3: Mean eﬃciency scores, obtained on Constant Returns to Scale (CRS),
Non Decreasing Returns to Scale (NDRS), Non Increasing Returns to Scale
(NIRS) or Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) assumption.
Moreover, eﬃcient banks are distributed equally across each asset-based
quartile. This means that there is no evidence of scale economies neither in the
sample of groups, neither in the one composed by the parent and subsidiaries
taken individually. However, using Stochastic Frontier Analysis, the authors
ﬁnd evidence of advantages in terms of economies of scope.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has reviewed the determinants of eﬃciency of the Italian banking
sector, mainly in order to single out economies of scale. Resti (1994, 1997) found
evidence of a competitive advantage for larger banks in terms of eﬃciency at the
beginning of the Nineties, while Favero and Papi (1995) found a generally higher
level of eﬃciency for Northern banks and banks engaged in non traditional
activities.
The last ﬁfteen years have brought big changes in the banking activity and
i nt h er o l eo fﬁn a n c i a li n s t i t u t i o n s . T h ec r e a t i o no fa ni n t e g r a t e dE u r o p e a n
Market put the banks of diﬀerent countries into direct competition. The analysis
of banking eﬃciency moved then to cross-countries comparisons and put into
evidence a low level of eﬃciency of Italian banks. In general, the scale economies
found by Resti at the beginning of the Nineties seem no longer to be supported
by later data. It is likely that a more developed market has put institutions in
a situation in which bigger banks have no advantages in terms of eﬃciency.
The last decade was characterized by a constant process of concentration.
As explained in the last section, there is no evidence that this trend has helped
banking institutions in becoming more cost eﬃcient. A possible explanation of
this fact is that, at least at early stages, the group is unable to exploit advan-
tages in terms of organizational ﬂexibility. Moreover, both Casu and Girardone
(2002) and Vander Vennet (2002) do not ﬁnd evidence of scale economies for
conglomerates. Italian banking groups, as well as the other European ones,
seem to have a competitive advantage over individual institutions not due to
size, but to the possibility of exploiting diversiﬁcation opportunities.
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